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Dominance through Coercion: Strategic
Rhetorical Balancing and the Tactics of
Justification in Afghanistan and Libya
Jack Holland and Mike Aaronson
This article analyses British and American justifications for military intervention
in the decade following 9/11. Taking Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011 as the
main case studies, the article explores the ways in which political elites attempt
to achieve policy dominance through rhetorical coercion, whereby potential
opponents are left unable to formulate a socially sustainable rebuttal. Specif-
ically, in these case studies, the article explores the use of strategic rhetorical
balancing, whereby secondary rationales for intervention are emphasized as
part of a tactic of justification designed to secure doubters’ acquiescence by
narrowing the discursive space in which an alternative counter-narrative could
be successfully and sustainably formulated.
Keywords intervention; rhetoric; language; Afghanistan; Libya
Introduction
In the changing geostrategic context of the early twenty-first century, as the
world moved from War on Terror to Arab Spring, the language of intervention
shifted in line with the politics of the moment, despite the fact that
interventionist foreign policies remained worryingly static. Just as the ‘War on
Terror’ was perceived to grant Blair and Bush right and reason to lecture states
‘harbouring’ terrorists, the Arab Spring was, once again, interpreted to afford
political elites a platform to demarcate oppressed citizen from oppressive ruler.
And, as before, this demarcation enabled western (coalition) military interven-
tion in non-western states. What changed was the manner in which such policies
were justified for British and American publics. This article explores these shifts
in justification, finding them to be driven by a consistent logic: a desire to win a
‘war of position’ at home. We argue that instrumental considerations, condi-
tioned by the context of recent events and public perceptions of them, inspire
the linguistic choices of political elites. The empirical evidence for this argument
is found in British and American justifications for intervention in Afghanistan in
2001 and Libya in 2011. Uniquely, this article undertakes a discourse analysis of
elite language in order to explore the ways in which secondary justifications for
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intervention have been emphasized in making the case for war. We argue that
this emphasis can usefully be understood as an attempt to coerce potential
domestic opponents into acquiescence, as elites strategically balance their
rhetoric in order to win a war of position through the silencing of alternatives.1
Structured in two sections, the article begins by conceptualizing the role of
language in achieving policy dominance at home. Here, we outline the article’s
theoretical contribution to an emerging critical constructivist literature. We
draw on Gramsci’s notion of a ‘war of position’, as well as recent critical
constructivist work on rhetorical coercion. Succinctly, our argument is that elites
act instrumentally in attempting to achieve policy dominance at home. While
invocations of the national interest remain paramount, political elites also
pursue a crucial strategy of rhetorical balancing. This strategy is central to a
tactic of justification that attempts to close down the space in which an
alternative stance can sustainably be taken. In the second section, the article
makes its empirical contribution, contrasting American and British justifications
for intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011. In Afghanistan and
Libya, American and British political elites have sought a ‘balance of rhetoric’ in
justifications for intervention, in an attempt to dominate policy debates at
home. The intriguing difference between these interventions is the context in
which they were justified. We show that these contextual demands required
coalition partners to emphasize different secondary justifications for interven-
tion. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of strategic
rhetorical balancing, as well as potential strategies for resistance.
The Language of Intervention: Strategic Rhetorical Balancing and the
Tactics of Justification
Winning the War of Position through Strategic Rhetorical Balancing
The case studies of Afghanistan and Libya demonstrate the instrumental use of
language by political elites who are keen to achieve support for intervention.
First, while international support is usually desired, domestic support takes
priority for a majority of western (interventionist) states, as a function of
democracy (Holland 2012). Second, this support and the strategy employed to
achieve it go beyond attempts to appeal and persuade. Resonance is, of course,
important. However, British and American efforts to craft compelling justifica-
tions for intervention are indicative of a more sophisticated attempt to ensure
official narratives win out. Building on an emerging critical constructivist
literature on rhetorical coercion, the argument that we make here is that
political elites frame foreign policy in a manner that seeks to ensure not only its
resonance but also its dominance (see Holland 2013b; Krebs 2005; Krebs and
Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 2009; Mattern 2001; McDonald and
Merefield 2010; Jackson 2011). Blair, Bush, Cameron and Obama have all
attempted, to differing extents and with varying degrees of success, to dominate
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debates on intervention. This dominance is achieved through the development of
specific tactics of justification, which are employed to fight and win a ‘war of
position’ (Cox 1983; Gramsci 1971; McDonald and Merefield 2010). Our focus here
then is unusual in three important senses. First, we focus on attempts to secure
acquiescence rather than to appeal. Second, within these strategies of coercion,
we focus on attempts to close down space through strategic rhetorical balancing,
rather than attempts at interpellation through invocations of the national
interest (e.g. Weldes 1996). And, third, we focus on the important role played
by secondary justifications within this strategic rhetorical balancing.
Considerable literature exists in IR and FPA analysing the role of language in
foreign policy (e.g. Campbell 1998; Jackson 2005; Larsen 1997). This literature
often emphasizes the discursive construction of international relations (e.g. Doty
1993), or the instrumentality of politicians attempting to win support (e.g.
Barnett 1999; Thrall 2009). However, while some excellent work has been done
on rhetorical coercion (e.g. McDonald and Merefield 2010), it currently remains
an underexplored and yet crucial aspect of foreign policy and intervention. To
date, Ron Krebs’s work represents one of the most sustained efforts to develop a
constructivist analysis of foreign policy centred on the force of rhetorical
coercion (e.g. Krebs 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007,
2009; see also Mattern 2005). For Krebs, political elites attempt to coerce
potential opponents rhetorically by removing access to those materials required
to formulate a socially sustainable rebuttal. Elite tactics of justification then
involve the closing down of the discursive space that an opponent might
otherwise be able to occupy successfully and sustainably. It is about out-
manoeuvring and pre-empting those who would proffer alternative and resist-
ance, if they were able and had they not lost a ‘war of position’ (Cox 1983;
Gramsci 1971; McDonald and Merefield 2010).
The fact that the word ‘elite’ appears frequently here is not inconsequential.
While important exceptions exist, particularly in the era of 24-hour news
coverage and public outrage at the violation of human rights norms (e.g. East
Timor in 1999), interventionist foreign policy is most frequently pursued by those
in positions of power within society, rather than those less engaged and less
interested in world affairs. In his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci (1971)
noted this important distinction between the political elite and population
at large, as well as its principal differences in distinct political systems.
For Gramsci, the relative ease of the Bolshevik Revolution—via a ‘war of
movement’—was due to the de-coupled nature of state–society relations in
Russia. In contrast, he suggested, the greater connectivity of state–society
relations in western democracies ensures that opponents of political elites must
first garner the support of (a more developed) civil society, if they are to
successfully challenge those with institutional power. Such a strategy entails a
‘war of position’, whereby opponents must build up social capital by crafting
competing narratives, into which the general population buy. These shape the
‘ability to imagine’ alternatives, as well as perceptions of their feasibility and
desirability (Crehan 2002, 71).
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While Gramsci’s attention was turned toward social upheaval and revolution,
his arguments are certainly of relevance to attempts to understand tactics of
elite justification. Political elites attempt to maintain their primacy in a war of
position by retaining the consent of the population which we argue, in addition
to resonance, requires the acquiescence of those who might, given a more
favourable discursive terrain, attempt to craft alternative policy platforms. In
today’s western democracies, the political capital accrued from election
victories alone is usually insufficient to sustain a case for military intervention
(Holland 2012). Political elites—those in and around government—know this, and
usually embark upon a particular and often well–thought-out public relations
strategy to garner support from those outside of the political elite. Gramsci (e.g.
1971) provides us with a theoretical framework to conceptualize this relation-
ship. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony—as domination through a combination of
consent and coercion (e.g. Cox 1983)—usefully indicates the twin dynamics at
the heart of relations between political elites and the general population on
matters of interventionist foreign policy. Of course, here we are deliberately
cross-contaminating both of Gramsci’s terms (consent and coercion) in order to
highlight the rhetorical coercion that is part and parcel of efforts to achieve
‘consent’. Attempts to appeal and to secure acquiescence, we argue, are
frequently mobilized alongside each other by political elites, in order to achieve
policy dominance at home.
Alongside efforts to paint a conceivable image of the world when justifying
intervention, political elites therefore attempt to construct foreign policy in
terms that make it both communicable and coercive (Holland 2013b). In the first
instance, political elites are often adept at constructing foreign policy in ways
that render it communicable, by using language that appeals to particular groups
within a domestic constituency. In part, this is why George W. Bush and Tony Blair
often sounded so different, even when justifying the same interventions (Holland
2013a). In the second instance, political elites often simultaneously attempt to
silence or bring to acquiescence those who might otherwise adopt an alternative
stance. It is this second strategy—wherein political opponents are co-opted
through a coercive linguistic tactic—that helps to explain the pattern of
justification evident in the US and UK, as they intervened in Afghanistan and
Libya. It is also this second strategy—of linguistic hegemony—that remains a
relatively new and therefore under-explored topic of enquiry in IR and FPA. Here,
we add an additional theoretical strand to our understanding of such strategy,
before detailing a new empirical case study, evidencing its importance. To do
this, we look beyond (important) invocations of the national identity, considering
instead the ‘shape’ of justifications of intervention, and in particular instances
of strategic rhetorical balancing through the emphasis of secondary justifications
for intervention.
It is certainly true that one of the most common and powerful strategies that
elites employ to co-opt opponents is the use of the language of national identity
and foundational values (e.g. Campbell 1998; Mattern 2001). In the United
States, it is perhaps members of the Democratic Party more than any other group
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who have come to understand the force of rhetorical coercion, through the
invocation of American values and identity. Krebs has traced one instance in
what has become an enduring strategy of rhetorically draping Republican
politicians in the Stars and Stripes (e.g. Krebs and Lobasz 2009). In 2002, the
Congressional vote on the use of force in Iraq was scheduled to force Democrats
to vote prior to their re-election campaigns. At this particular moment, Saddam
Hussein’s Ba’ath Party had been constructed, in the language of the Bush
Administration, as a regime of pure evil, which threatened the fundamental
‘freedom’ that Americans cherished (Collins and Glover 2002; Jackson 2005;
Silberstein 2002). To oppose the Bush Administration meant adopting a stance
that could readily be equated with appeasement, cowardice and a lack of
patriotism. Portrayed as failing to tackle evil and defend freedom, opponents
risked the appearance of lacking in love for their country, or even as threatening
the very values that are seen to underpin the greatness of the American nation.2
Faced with the possibility of such a politically debilitating perception, it is
unsurprising that many potential opponents opted to contest more minor,
procedural issues—troop levels, timescales and the like—rather than oppose the
decision to intervene in the first place.
While we agree (and have argued elsewhere) that invocations of the national
identity are of vital importance in achieving support and acquiescence for
interventionist foreign policies, political elites have undeniably attached
considerable (and, at times, fundamental) significance to the pursuit of policy
dominance through alternative tactics. Policy dominance, we argue, is often
(and has recently been) achieved through the coercive effects of emphasizing
secondary justifications for intervention, such that they narrow the discursive
space from which ‘critical’ voices, inclined to alternative arguments, might
proffer counter-narratives. Without such a strategy on the part of political elites
oppositional counter-narratives would be able to engage the primary justifica-
tions of elites, undermining them from an entirely alternative angle. Political
elites seize the rhetorical frames of potential opponents, folding them into their
own case for war as secondary justifications. It is this ‘balancing’ of the case for
war, through the expansion of the justificatory frames of elites and the seizing of
rhetorical ground, that concerns us here and shapes our understanding of appeals
to secondary justifications, which initially played a more minor or supporting
discursive role.
The crafting of a strategically balanced narrative, which appears to account
for all considerations simultaneously, serves to blunt the rhetorical charges of
domestic political foes. In this situation, potential opponents are left to argue
about and not for their particular rhetorical concern (e.g. the national interest);
the debate becomes about what is (and what is in) the national interest, rather
than an argument for a policy that prioritizes the pursuit of the national interest
(over and above, for example, a policy premised on delivering humanitarian
goals). The force of this relegation is to manoeuvre opponents into a position
where they are more likely to opt (of their own volition) for silence, acquies-
cence or the negotiation of procedure—such as the terms and type of
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intervention—rather than contest the general thrust of policy in the first place.
In short, strategic rhetorical balancing, through the emphasis of secondary
justifications for intervention, helps elites to win a war of position and achieve
policy dominance at home, thus helping to enable military intervention.
Case Study Selection and Methodology
This article analyses two case studies: US/UK interventions in Afghanistan in 2001
and Libya in 2011. In the case of the former, this case study is limited to the
three-month period in which principal combat operations were carried out, prior
to the deployment of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. These case
studies are chosen for three main reasons. First, the two interventions share a
number of key features, which helps to render them appropriate as vehicles for
the comparison of British and American justifications of intervention. Second,
they enable a ‘double comparison’, in which British and American justifications
for intervention can be compared: (i) with each other, at two moments in time,
ten years apart; and (ii) through time, as they evolved over the course of a
decade, when faced with new circumstances and contexts. Third, these cases are
chosen due to the inappropriateness of alternatives: most significantly, the 2003
War in Iraq.
On the first, Operations Enduring Freedom and Odyssey Dawn (Operation
Ellamy for the British) shared the objectives of supporting locals (the United
Front/Northern Alliance and National Transitional Council and allies), maximizing
strategic advantage through overwhelming aerial supremacy and minimizing the
role and exposure of coalition troops in the intervention’s initial stages. In
Afghanistan, limited troop engagement was, of course, a temporary set-up; it
was also, however, a central component of the conflict’s early military strategy.
In Libya, the war largely progressed in line with the lessons of Afghanistan and
the broader War on Terror in mind: it was a conflict fought principally through
out-of-favour rebel groups on the ground, backed by US/UK/NATO air power.
And, of course, one of the most intriguing questions, in view of limited legal
authority, remains the role of coalition special forces on the ground in Libya, who
appear to have played a similar (if clandestine) role to equivalent forces in
Afghanistan, helping to train and guide local fighters. While we could certainly
have chosen highly divergent conflicts and still gathered legitimate data, this
comparison helps to reduce concerns (as much as is feasibly possible) that
justifications diverge solely due to the distinct nature of the impending
intervention.
On the second, the selection of these particular case studies enables
synchronic and diachronic comparisons: between states and over time. The
selection of these case studies enables us to bring into direct comparison the
strategic justifications of four important political elites: Prime Ministers Blair
and Cameron, and Presidents Bush and Obama. This double comparison heightens
the validity of our empirical analysis by enabling us to consider the strategic use
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of language by two states, in two states. Usefully, they also enable us to consider
politicians from both sides of the British and American political divides.
On the third, these are the only two interventions, meeting the necessary
criteria, which are broadly comparable. Only the War in Iraq stands out as a
potential omission, given the US/UK-led military intervention of 2003. However,
first, the justifications for this war are situated in a lengthy prehistory of
wrangling over weapons inspections and UN resolutions, which bias the
justifications that were used. Second, the scale of this conflict and its nature
are markedly different from Afghanistan and Libya, with ground forces invading
from the south from the intervention’s outset. Third, Bush and Blair (in
particular) struggled to convince and coerce their respective domestic popula-
tions. Although, on the eve of war, Blair did ultimately achieve a majority of
support amongst the British populace, this remained an incredibly divisive war.
Afghanistan and Libya, on the other hand, achieved broad support and
acquiescence, enabling us to compare two successful instances of rhetorical
coercion. For our purposes, Iraq is important because of its impact on the
context in which intervention in Libya was justified.
In each case, we focus on the words of Blair, Bush, Cameron and Obama, as
the principal actors involved in the articulation of foreign policy. Their
institutional positions mean that their words carry the most weight, and they
stand out as the primary mouthpiece of government in voicing the nation’s
foreign policy. By 2001, Blair was particularly dominant in the crafting and
articulation of British foreign policy. He had also recently won re-election. Bush
too was enjoying what would be his highest ever approval ratings in the days and
weeks before intervention in Afghanistan. In 2011, Cameron and Obama were
both still finding their feet in terms of foreign policy; we therefore afford
additional attention to the words of the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State
respectively. In each case, we collected and analysed the foreign policy-focussed
speeches, statements and press releases of these political elites. We performed a
discourse analysis of these speeches, in order to classify justifications into two
principal categories—those emphasizing the national interest and those emphas-
izing humanitarian concerns—and a range of subcategories (e.g. Fairclough
2000, 2003). In significant part, this analysis made use of computer-aided
coding and retrieval. NVivo software facilitated hierarchical coding of national
interest and humanitarian premised arguments, through a variety of related
discursive nodal points (e.g. ‘9/11’, ‘regime change’ and ‘human rights’).
Below we select quotations that usefully encapsulate broader patterns of
justification.
Harbouring Terrorists and Humanitarian Assistance: Justifying
Intervention in Afghanistan
The events of 11 September 2001 conditioned the subsequent American-led
intervention in Afghanistan in two important ways. First, intervention was
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justified principally through the language of national security and the avoidance
of a second 9/11; the human rights abuses of the Taliban regime were a
secondary and merely additional concern. Nonetheless these concerns served the
useful political function of helping to quell dissent. Second, the location of the
events of 11 September 2001 ensured that intervention was primarily justified
with recourse to the reestablishment of American national security. Thus, for
junior coalition partners such as the United Kingdom, strategic rhetorical
balancing was required to convince the domestic population of the necessity of
intervention. In this task, Blair went out of his way to emphasize: (i) the threat
to Britain and (ii) the threat to ordinary Afghans.
American Justifications for Intervention in Afghanistan
American justifications for intervention in Afghanistan framed Operation Endur-
ing Freedom first and foremost as a ‘War on Terror’, in pursuit of national
security, over and above humanitarian concerns (Bush 2001a). While President
Bush was initially cautious in his choice of language and phrasing, the notion that
the United States was at war quickly took hold within the administration
(Woodward 2003). It did not take long for 9/11, initially described by the
President as a ‘national tragedy’, to be deemed ‘a series of despicable acts of
war’ (Bush 2001b, 2001c). Framing 9/11 as ‘an act of war’ served to naturalize
and rally support for military intervention but, importantly, it also served to
heighten the tensions with later humanitarian justifications.
On the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom, Bush asserted that ‘America
respects the Afghan people, their long tradition and their proud independence.
And we will help them in this time of confusion and crisis in their country’ (Bush
2001d). There was, of course, a considerable irony in talk of Afghan independ-
ence at a time of confusion and crisis, which required US assistance to resolve,
when that confusion, crisis and loss of Afghan independence was once again
arriving, in considerable part, from the act of intervention. Such tensions in
American desires to justify intervention with recourse to additional humanitarian
concerns were commonplace throughout the conflict. The apparent paradox of
marrying humanitarian justifications with the principal language of American
security was frequently apparent. On the first evening of Operation Enduring
Freedom, for instance, Bush insisted that American forces would simultaneously
drop bombs and food:
At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity
of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food,
medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children
of Afghanistan. (Bush 2001e)
This two-track approach of national interest-based counter-terrorism
alongside so-called humanitarian relief efforts continued throughout the early
weeks of conflict. ‘While we are holding the Taliban government accountable,
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we’re also feeding Afghan people’ (Bush 2001f). The unifying concept put
forward in an attempt to overcome these obvious (and potentially debilitat-
ing) tensions was the apparent nature of the regime. Linked through the
metaphor of ‘harbouring’, Bush conflated Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts
to argue that the spectacular terrorism the world had recently witnessed on
11 September was the external manifestation of a long history of cruelty
within Afghanistan.
We have also seen the true nature of these terrorists in the nature of the
regime they support in Afghanistan – and it’s terrifying. Women are imprisoned
in their homes, and are denied access to basic health care and education. Food
sent to help starving people is stolen by their leaders. The religious monuments
of other faiths are destroyed. Children are forbidden to fly kites, or sing songs,
or build snowmen. A girl of seven is beaten for wearing white shoes. Our
enemies have brought only misery and terror to the people of Afghanistan –
and now they are trying to export that terror throughout the world. (Bush
2001g)
Within this framing of the Afghan threat, ultimately the world (or at least
‘freedom-loving countries everywhere’) and innocent, oppressed Afghan citizens
wanted the same thing: to say ‘good riddance’ to the regime.
Throughout this battle, we adhere to our values. Unlike our enemy, we respect
life. We do not target innocent civilians. We care for the innocent people of
Afghanistan, so we continue to provide humanitarian aid, even while their
government tries to steal the food we send. When the terrorists and their
supporters are gone, the people of Afghanistan will say with the rest of the
world: good riddance. (Bush 2001h)
Within the logic of American justifications of intervention then, both the
counter-terrorism and humanitarian missions possessed a mutual aim. While
proclaimed desires to end oppression were certainly secondary within American
justifications for intervention, voices questioning this welcome additional
benefit were rendered scarce. It is important to clarify that we understand
secondary justifications not in opposition or addition to ‘real’ reasons (although
others might wish to make that claim) but as distinct from and often receiving
less (initial) attention than primary justifications. Frequently, secondary justifi-
cations chronologically follow primary justifications, in their articulation, level
of prominence, and the degree of emphasis they are afforded. Through their
(later) incorporation into the interventionist frames of elites, however, these
secondary justifications take on an importance in enabling policy through the
rhetorical coercion of potential opponents that belies their denotation as
‘secondary’. While a minority of oppositional voices did recall Afghanistan’s
long history of repelling invaders, the notion that oppression justified action
prevailed, even if pursuit of the national interest was the principal justification
for intervention (e.g. Shepherd 2006). This is evidenced in the records of
the Witness and Response Collection of the Library of Congress. Interviews
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with ‘ordinary Americans’ reveal (humanitarian) concerns that were initially
apparent—fears about the moral equivalency of killing innocent Afghans, for
example—were slowly downplayed, in line with the Bush Administration’s
increased emphasis on the humanitarian rationale for war (Holland 2009). While
this strategic rhetorical balancing was unlikely to be fundamental to the
prosecution of intervention (due to the upwelling of public support for
intervention in pursuit of the national interest), it was certainly useful in
curtailing the concerns of potential (ethical) objectors.
British Justifications for Intervention in Afghanistan
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly adept at
reminding sceptics that their calls not to intervene would constitute de facto
support for an oppressive regime. Following the ‘major combat operations’ of
Operation Enduring Freedom, Blair reminded doubters:
… for goodness sake, let’s rejoice in what has been achieved, and let’s realise too
that the victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan wasn’t just a military victory,
it was a political victory. People in Afghanistan have been liberated from one of
the most vile and oppressive regimes in the world. (Blair 2002)3
There was undoubtedly a greater balance between realism and moralism in
British justifications for intervention than American counterparts. Blair’s use of
humanitarian arguments reflected the political logic of responding to the events
of 9/11. Notwithstanding Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,4 it was not a
straightforward claim that Britain had a role to play in a coalition intervention
that constituted a response to events in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania.
With this in mind, Blair took far greater efforts to achieve two important
rhetorical manoeuvres. First, Blair emphasized that the British national interest
was engaged in fighting and winning a war against terrorists and their state
sponsors in Afghanistan.
I also want to say very directly to the British people why this matters so much
directly to Britain. First let us not forget that the attacks of the September 11th
represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. The
murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon
Britain. But even if no British citizen had died it would be right to act.
… the al-Qaeda network threatens Europe, including Britain … we have a
direct interest in acting in our own self defence to protect British lives. (Blair
2001a)
Second, rather than a mere ‘additional’ justification, Blair insisted that
arguments on the ‘humanitarian side’ of intervention were just ‘as important’ as
those ‘on the military side’. This emphasis was such that the coalition’s raison
d’être became humanitarian provision: ‘We have established an effective
coalition to deal with the humanitarian crisis in the region … Our priority has
been to re-establish food supply routes into Afghanistan’ (Blair 2001b). Like
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Bush, Blair spoke frequently and at length about the human rights abuses of the
regime, but he went further in his insistence that the ‘humanitarian coalition’
would deliver on the ‘humanitarian front’ in the face of a ‘humanitarian crisis’
(2001a, 2001b, 2001c). The emphasis on helping ordinary Afghans was note-
worthy although perhaps to be expected from a leader who had steered New
Labour’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ towards his own ‘doctrine of international
community’—a variant that, whilst saturated with the language of morality and
human rights, was most obviously defined by its focus on intervention (see Blair
1999; Holland 2012; Lawler 2000). Emphasizing the engagement of the British
national interest and humanitarian rationale reflected Blair’s broader political
project and the demands of the domestic political context. Rhetorical balancing
had already served Blair well in framing domestic policy (Holland 2012); in the
realm of foreign policy, accentuated appeals to secondary rationale helped to
silence doubters and co-opt potential opponents. For instance, ‘the leader of the
Opposition, Iain Duncan Smith, supported the Government’s position’, repeat-
edly prefixing approval with ‘as the Prime Minister has said’ (HCRP 2001; HC Deb
2001a, 2001b). Emphasizing the national interest was important in achieving the
support of an opposition party not long separated from the overt realpolitik of
Malcolm Rifkind, while bold rhetorical contrasts made opposing Blair’s apparent
quest to defend human rights appear cold-hearted and cowardly. In Afghanistan,
as he admitted when recalling justifications for intervention in Kosovo, Blair
sought a strategic rhetorical balancing to ensure victory in the war of position at
home (Blair, cited in Coughlin 2006, 104).
R2P and Regime Change: Justifying Intervention in Libya
The context of a lamented War on Terror, juxtaposed with the optimism of the
Arab Spring, conditioned intervention in Libya in two important ways. First, in
contrast to Afghanistan, intervention was justified primarily on humanitarian
grounds; national interests were a secondary justification that nonetheless
served an important political function. Emphasizing the national interest was
an attempt to outflank potential critics. Second, and relatedly, the domestic
and international context made articulating a clear and consistent position on
regime change particularly challenging. Secondary desires to avoid the com-
plete alienation of Russia and China combined with the principal concern of
political elites: to ensure potential domestic opponents were denied material
for the formulation of a successful counter-argument. This concern was
especially acute given the fertile landscape provided by public distrust
following the Iraq War. Alongside a reduced commitment to nation-building,
the implication of this immediate political context and the broader political
fallout of the War on Terror was that ‘regime change’ was pitched as a desirable
indirect consequence (not explicit end goal), attached to a solely humanitarian
cause.
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American Justifications for Intervention in Libya
The impact of this new domestic context on justifications for intervention took
two principal forms. First, Obama’s apparent hesitancy led to one of his own
advisors labelling American strategy as ‘leading from behind’. Despite the riposte
from the President that the US leads ‘from the front’ (Lizza 2011), the Obama
Administration’s initial caution was plain to see. For instance, although clear on
the desirability of regime change—insisting Gaddafi had ‘lost the legitimacy
to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now’ (Obama
2011a)—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initially refused to commit the United
States to enforcing a no-fly zone and explicitly ruled out unilateral action
(Clinton 2011a). Second, the Obama Administration was nonetheless forthright in
its humanitarian arguments from the outset of the unfolding crisis, playing up the
notion and importance of an altruistic policy. One month prior to the
implementation of UNSCR 1973, Clinton and Obama condemned ‘outrageous
and unacceptable’ Libyan human rights abuses:
The Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence, to allow
humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, and to respect the rights of its
people. It must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities,
and face the cost of continued violations of human rights. (Obama 2011b)
Now is the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed. (Clinton 2011b)
At this stage intervention was clearly justified with recourse to a humanitarian
rationale. However, by the end of March, when Obama delivered the definitive
statement of US policy, he was careful to justify intervention with reference to
both values and interests: ‘we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the
world’s many challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we
have a responsibility to act’ (Obama 2011c). Significantly, Obama also clarified
how US strategic interests were at stake, referring to the negative consequences
of refugees fleeing Libya and putting a strain on the transitions in neighbouring
Egypt and Tunisia. He added that if Gaddafi had been allowed to remain in power
this would have encouraged other dictators, undermined the credibility of the
UN, and ‘would have carried a far greater price for America’. This is a common
rhetorical strategy in placating doubters of an intervention’s merit. The message
is clear: act now, to avoid spending more treasure and spilling more blood in the
future.
In justifying intervention, however, the American national interest always
remained a secondary argument to that of Gaddafi’s actions and America’s
calling to put an end to them. Despite playing up American interests, Obama
argued that intervention was nonetheless first and foremost about realizing
America’s unique responsibilities to fellow humans:
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our
responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have
been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to
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atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as
President, I refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before
taking action. (Obama 2011c)
The second major point to note is that, despite insisting Gaddafi should leave,
the Obama Administration avoided calls for a policy of regime change.
Throughout the intervention, Obama was at pains to emphasize that what had
been done was in support of a popular uprising against Gaddafi, a leader who had
forfeited the right to lead his people. But by the end of March, in the context of
post-Iraq America, regime change had become controversial and a potential
rallying point for political opponents. On the one hand, the likes of John McCain
and Joseph Lieberman ‘call[ed] for a strategy in Libya that identifies and
achieves U.S. interests and includes the ouster of Gaddafi’ (Liebermann and
McCain 2011). On the other hand, Obama faced a backlash from his own party,
as well as Democrat and independent voters, who felt he was returning
America to the policies of George W. Bush. With the likes of McCain and
Liebermann far more supportive of intervention in the first place, Obama had
to placate the second group. He did so by suggesting that regime change would
be welcomed, but was not American policy towards Libya. He was explicit in
stating that:
The task that I assigned our forces – to protect the Libyan people from immediate
danger and to establish a no-fly zone – carries with it a U.N. mandate and
international support. It’s also what the Libyan opposition asked us to do. If we
tried to overthrow Gaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We would likely
have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that mission, or risk killing
many civilians from the air. The dangers faced by our men and women in uniform
would be far greater. So would the costs and our share of the responsibility for
what comes next. (Obama 2011c)
Obama was equally clear that the changed context of 2011, in contrast to that of
2001 and 2003, was central to his thinking, language and policy: ‘To be blunt, we
went down that road in Iraq … That is not something we can afford to repeat in
Libya’ (Obama 2011c).
The refusal to give explicit voice to a policy of regime change through military
means had important implications for the nature as well as possibility of
intervention. First, it served as a useful justification for the adoption of a
broadly ‘Afghan model’ of intervention, with a remote warfare strategy which,
once it was over, allowed Vice-President Joe Biden to claim as a measure of
success that America ‘didn’t lose a single life’ (Biden 2011). Second, it alleviated
the pressure of calls for America to stay the course, after major combat
operations had ended. Third, and most importantly, however, it helped to silence
those who were most outraged at America’s pre-emptive and unilateral policy of
regime change in Iraq (see, for example, Friedman 2011). Obama’s justification
for intervention denied these potential opponents resources they could have
otherwise used in crafting an effective and socially sustainable rebuttal.
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British Justifications for Intervention in Libya
As with the United States, the two principal features of the British case for
intervention in Libya were: (i) the strategic rhetorical balancing of calls to protect
civilians with the language of the national interest; and (ii) the downplaying of
regime change, such that it was framed as an indirect humanitarian outcome,
rather than an explicit political aim. Like Obama, Cameron was clear that regime
change would be welcomed. However, it was only later that talk of regime change
was tempered; in the early stages of justifying intervention, Cameron was far
bolder in his calls for Gaddafi’s ousting: ‘Col Gaddafi’s regime must end and he
must leave’; ‘this is an illegitimate regime that has lost the consent of its people,
and our message to Col Gaddafi is simple: go now’ (Cameron 2011b). At this stage,
Cameron insisted the ‘murderous’ regime would ‘face the justice they deserve’;
the message was one of military action, to topple Gaddafi and avert the very ‘real
danger … of a humanitarian crisis inside Libya’. It was only later that Cameron
would bring his language into line with the lack of public appetite for such a policy,
in the wake of Iraq, and the restricted terms of UN Security Council Resolution
1973 sanctioning the intervention. At this stage, Cameron balanced calls for
regime change through military means with calls for intervention on humanitarian
grounds. This positioning left Cameron’s opponents little room for manoeuvre.
During parliamentary debate on the issue of intervention, the Leader of the
Opposition was rhetorically co-opted. The use of overt humanitarian reasoning,
within the structures and norms of international society, made opposition difficult,
helping to ensure the support and/or acquiescence of potential opponents, with
key political foes concurring whole-heartedly:
I think that the whole House will endorse the Prime Minister’s view that the only
acceptable future is one without Colonel Gaddafi and his regime. We welcome
what the Prime Minister said about a possible no-fly zone. We also welcome the
international isolation of Libya expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1970,
including sanctions and an arms embargo, and the decision to refer the killing of
protesters to the International Criminal Court. (Miliband 2011)
However, as the bombing campaign commenced, the contradiction between the
civilian protection mandate from UNSCR 1973 and the government’s declared
position that Gaddafi should go led to questions being raised as to whether
Gaddafi himself could be the target of airstrikes. After struggling to overcome
this tension, Cameron eventually articulated the following position:
our role is to enforce that UN Security Council Resolution. Many people will ask
questions … about regime change … I have been clear: I think Libya needs to get
rid of Gaddafi. But, in the end, we are responsible for trying to enforce that
Security Council resolution; the Libyans must choose their own future.
The UN Resolution … explicitly does not provide legal authority for action to
bring about Gaddafi’s removal from power by military means … but our view is
clear: there is no decent future for Libya with Colonel Gaddafi remaining in
power. (Cameron 2011c)
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In other words, like Obama, Cameron’s later justification for intervention in
Libya avoided openly articulating a direct political desire to see Gaddafi ousted.
The UK’s political objective may well have been the removal of Gaddafi, but it
was not astute to openly articulate it as such. Talk of ‘regime change’ had raised
the spectre of Iraq in British political discourse. As the bombing of Libya
progressed, the toxicity of the term ‘regime change’ became increasingly
apparent. Conservative Member of Parliament John Baron, for example, was
outspoken in opposition to the apparent Anglo-American mission creep. First, he
explicitly linked interventionist policy in Libya to that of the War on Terror in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, he argued that while the intervention in Libya
‘was justified on humanitarian grounds’, what the west had actually pursued and
delivered was ‘the longest assassination attempt in history’ (Baron 2011). These
reasons explain why, even if ‘carrying out the UN resolution and forcing out
Gaddafi [were] pretty much the same thing’—they were ‘coterminous missions’—
the British Government had ‘to pretend that they are separate’ (see d’Ancona
2011). In this, the British Government was surprisingly successful. The appear-
ance of an indigenized conflict—a civil war in which Britain was neutral beyond a
mandate to protect civilians—led Ban Ki-moon to proclaim: ‘changes of regime
were done by the people, not by the intervention of any foreign forces’ (Press
Conference, 14 December 2011).
The second interesting component of Cameron’s rhetoric for our purposes was
his invocation of the British national interest to balance a humanitarian case for
war. We do not argue that Cameron believed the national interest was unengaged;
we neither claim to know nor require such knowledge for our analysis. Rather, we
argue that the national interest was, at least in part, invoked in order to silence
those sceptical of an intervention designed solely to ‘save strangers’. Replicating
Blair’s arguments on Kosovo 12 years earlier, Cameron asserted that:
If Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya will once again become a
pariah state, festering on Europe’s border, a source of instability, exporting strife
beyond her borders. A state from which literally hundreds of thousands of
citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure on us in Europe. (Cameron
2011a)
And, cutting to the heart of arguments centred on realpolitik, Cameron spelt out
for the British public why the UK had to take action:
We must remember that Gaddafi is a dictator who has a track record of violence
and support for terrorism against our country and against Scotland specifically.
The people of Lockerbie … know what he is capable of. (Cameron 2011a)
His efforts to balance the humanitarian rationale for intervention could hardly
have been blunter:
I am clear: taking action in Libya is in our national interest and that’s why
Britain, with our allies like America and France, and alongside the Arab world,
must play our part in responding to this crisis. (Cameron 2011a)
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In this rhetorical balancing, Cameron sounded Blairite, repeating the trick of
enforced acquiescence through a targeted tactics of justification. On the one
hand, the language of defending human rights ensured the majority of backbench
Liberal Democrats and Labour MPs supported government policy. On the other
hand, attempts to play up the engagement of the British national interest helped
to limit criticism from within the Conservative Party and quell support for
seemingly legitimate counter-arguments such as those of John Baron. In short,
strategic rhetorical balancing helped Cameron to win the war of position and
deliver a dominant interventionist policy.
Conclusion
Politicians act instrumentally in choosing to justify interventions with recourse to
particular arguments. These efforts go beyond attempting to ‘sell’ policy at
home. Rather, since 9/11, political leaders in the US and UK have employed a
‘tactic of justification’ that seeks to quell dissent, silence doubters and secure
the acquiescence of potential opponents. In addition to its (primary) empirical
contribution, then, the article’s (secondary) theoretical contribution centres on
the identification of a crucial, often unacknowledged, form of rhetorical
coercion: strategic balancing. While appeals to the national identity dominate
processes of rhetorical coercion and their study, rhetorical balancing is a crucial
additional component of crafting coercive policy, capable of winning out in the
battle to justify intervention. In this war of position, political leaders pursue a
strategic rhetorical balancing of the principal rationale for intervention, in order
to deny others access to the discursive space and materials they would require in
order to formulate a socially sustainable rebuttal. American and British
justifications for intervention in Afghanistan and Libya most certainly made use
of the language of national identity and appeals to notions of foundational values
under threat. However, in these case studies, strategic rhetorical balancing
meant that Blair, Bush, Cameron and Obama all emphasized secondary motiva-
tions for intervention in an effort to close down the political terrain from which a
rhetorical counter-offensive could be launched.
In Afghanistan, Bush spoke of dropping ‘bombs’ and ‘food’ in order to quell
those voices most loudly comparing and equating the events of 9/11 with the
human toll that the invasion of Afghanistan would inevitably reap. Likewise,
Blair’s emphasis on the rationality of intervention, as assessed against the threat
to British territorial sovereignty and the national interest, can and should be
read as an instrumental attempt to silence and secure the acquiescence of those
critics who would otherwise most readily question British involvement. In the
case of Libya we see the same underpinning logic of rhetorical coercion, which
inspired Obama to balance the humanitarian case for intervention strategically
with recourse to the national interest and instrumentally curtail public rhetoric
on regime change. While both Obama and Cameron gave voice, principally, to
humanitarian concerns, they also felt the need to play up the strategic interests
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that Libyan instability impinged upon. These concerns were emphasized primar-
ily to placate those who most feared the costs of another war, following the
quagmire of Iraq. Thus, while the Libyan example reverses the emphasis of
justifications on display in 2001, the logic of rhetorical coercion holds true.
The implications of this persistent logic are worrying, both at home—
concerning issues of democracy and bipartisanship—and abroad—in terms of
the nature of international intervention. Our concerns here centre on the impact
of strategic rhetorical balancing on: (i) the possibility, nature, effectiveness and
ethicality of intervention, if it is shaped by the demands of domestic coercion;
and (ii) the health of the marketplace of ideas, if the suffocation of alternative
policies is a central component of achieving policy dominance in a democracy.
While our argument and use of the phrase ‘balance of rhetoric’ makes no
attempt to map onto theories pertaining to a ‘balance of power’, it is certainly
true that power is crucial here. Rhetorical coercion, at its most effective, can
lead to an imbalance of power within the domestic politics of an interventionist
state. This imbalance can lead to hegemony in the production of interventionist
discourses, suffocating potentially less violent alternatives. We fear that
pursuing a war of position through coercive tactics of justification helps to
drown out (useful and often more effective or principled) policy alternatives. We
therefore offer a threefold strategy of resistance. A rebalancing of rhetoric
might usefully be informed by: considerations of the longue durée (beyond
political short-termism); expansion of the fractures in divergent coalition
framings; and/or the immanent critique of justifications wherein policy fails to
deliver on promise. These strategies of resistance should follow further research
on rhetorical coercion generally and strategic rhetorical balancing specifically.
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Notes
1 We use the term ‘strategic rhetorical balancing’ as entirely distinct from theories
pertaining to a balance of power.
2 It would be possible to argue that the War on Terror was perhaps an extreme example
of the suffocating and oppressive dominance of official discourse, were it not for the
similar experience of the Cold War. The publication of lists of dangerous academics during
the War on Terror, for example, can be seen as a ghostly echo of McCarthyism (e.g.
Horowitz 2006). These academics were supposedly threatening the United States through
their opposition to government policy.
3 Blair would later come to repeat these arguments in post hoc justifications for
intervention in Iraq, reminding those who opposed his decision that, had they got their
wish, they would live in a world where Saddam Hussein continued his reign of terror over
millions of Iraqis.
4 Requiring NATO members to come to the support of any member who is attacked by an
external adversary.
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